In the late Qing and early Republican eras, eastern Tibet (Kham) was a borderland on the cusp of political and economic change. Straddling Sichuan Province and central Tibet, it was coveted by both Chengdu and Lhasa. Informed by an absolutist conception of territorial sovereignty, Sichuan officials sought to exert exclusive authority in Kham by severing its inhabitants from regional and local influence. The resulting efforts to arrest the flow of rupees from British India and the flow of cultural identity entwined with Buddhism from Lhasa were grounded in two misperceptions: that Khampa opposition to Chinese rule was external, fostered solely by local monasteries as conduits of Lhasa's spiritual authority, and that Sichuan could arrest such influence, the absence of which would legitimize both exclusive authority in Kham and regional assertions of sovereignty. The intersection of these misperceptions with the significance of Buddhism in Khampa identity determined the success of Sichuan's policies and the focus of this article, the minting and circulation of the first and only Qing coin emblazoned with an image of the emperor. It was a flawed axiom of state and nation builders throughout the world that severing local cultural or spiritual influence was possible-or even necessary-to effect a borderland's incorporation.
of the borderland population needed to be changed in order to render the borderland an integral part of the state (see, for instance, Harrell 1995; Lary 2007, 6-8) .
This unidimensional conception of identity was a response to the geopolitical position in the early twentieth century of Kham, which lay at the edge of Qing imperial and state space, situated between Sichuan and central Tibet along the empire's southwestern border with British India. Informed by their adoption of an absolutist conception of territorial sovereignty, Sichuan officials in the late Qing and early Republican eras sought to shield Kham from all external influences and to exclude any challenge to their exercise of authority over the territory and its inhabitants, an exclusive authority legitimated only by the absence of such challenges. The resulting policies were premised on two intertwined misperceptions. The first, evident in Fengquan's initial encounter with the dépa and his tumultuous tenure in Batang, was the widespread conceit that Khampa opposition to Qing and Republican policies was solely external, the influence of the monasteries of Kham as conduits of the spiritual-and subversive-authority of the Dalai Lama. This misperception was based on a flawed understanding of the character of the Khampas-that their identity was malleable-and an implicit rejection of the validity of a competing set of cultural mores.
The second misperception was grounded in an absolutist conception of territorial sovereignty adapted by the gentry and officials of Sichuan to address their tenuous authority in Kham. This was derived from the ideal Euro-American rhetoric of international law introduced to China in the late nineteenth century. Under this conception, the gentry and officials believed that the provincial government possessed the power to arrest undesirable and threatening external flows, material or otherwise, across newly delineated and strengthened borders encircling the Kham borderlands. Whereas the British Indian challenge to Chinese authority was limited largely to the realm of commerce, Lhasa's spiritual challenge was more fundamental, threatening to obstruct Qing-and Republican-era efforts to incorporate Kham and its inhabitants into the burgeoning Chinese state and nation. Simultaneously dependent on and indicative of the exercise of exclusive authority in the borderlands, this presumed power was fundamental to policies enacted to thwart both regional and local challenges, yet it was ultimately incapable of excluding all external influences from Kham.
The question of whether a state government's effort to exercise absolute and exclusive authority in its borderlands necessitated the region's isolation from the external flow of competing political, social, and economic influences is central to understanding the borderland's role in state building and state consolidation. Borderland scholars since Peter Sahlins (1989) have challenged the narrative that the state center dominated and transformed its peripheral regions. As Mark Elliott (2014, (345) (346) The resulting dynamism in borderland regions had a profound effect on local identity and the character of the Chinese nation-state. Yet in the wake of Taiwan's 1895 cession to Meiji Japan and European imperialism's subsequent intensified effort to carve spheres of territorial influence across the empire, convergence of the globalizing norm of territorial sovereignty with heightened fear of territorial encroachment on the plateau from British India or Russia foreclosed acceptance of such dynamism in Kham. An absolutist conception of the norm adopted by Sichuan officials equated demonstrable exercise of exclusive authority with inviolable borders and a unidimensional identity, the latter echoing Fengquan's conceit.
This article explores the intersection of perception and reality and the influence of the two misperceptions detailed above on the efforts of Sichuan Province officials during the late Qing and early Republican eras to exert such authority in Kham by arresting material flows such as rupees from British India, and the spiritual-cultural identity entwined with Buddhism flowing from Lhasa. Regional and local, respectively, each flow presented different challenges to Chinese authority in Kham during the borderland region's tumultuous transition from empire to nation-state in the early twentieth century. The first section briefly introduces the contentious local and regional situation in the Kham borderlands at the turn of the nineteenth century, which was manifest in a bifurcated structure of competing authority between the Sichuan and Lhasa governments. The second section then analyzes the transformative influence wrought by the globalizing norm of territorial sovereignty. The final two sections turn to a case study of Sichuan officials' efforts to arrest the flow of Empress Victoria rupees, bolstered by spiritual misidentification, from British India into Kham.
In response to the rupee's ubiquity as currency across the plateau as far east as Dartsedo (Dajianlu, known today as Kangding), and the debilitating effects of the corresponding was accompanied by a comprehensive endeavor for the region's transformation and incorporation, comprising a range of policies similarly informed by the misperceptions noted above, intended to arrest the flow of competing influences and to undermine the monasteries' power in Kham society. Echoing the New Policies (xinzheng) that were changing the society of neidi at the time (see Reynolds 1993) , the endeavor included compulsory education, the tightening of Sichuan's control over regional commerce, the establishment of new industry, an expansion of mining, and the enactment of hygiene regulations.
Sichuan and later Republican officials' assertion of inviolable borders around the Kham borderland simultaneously made possible and necessitated the quashing of ambiguity, whether of identity or authority, in the commercial, spiritual, and temporal realms. These officials perceived that only subversion of the monasteries' influence as a conduit for Lhasa's competing spiritual and cultural authority could free the Khampas to become "Chinese." The relative success and failure of these efforts to sever Kham from commercial and spiritual networks, from the greater region and from Lhasa, were determined at the intersection of Chinese perception and reality, by the degree of each flow's integration into Khampa society and the persuasive power of each Chinese alternative. The presumption that it was necessary-or even possible-to sever local cultural or spiritual influence on a borderland population, or to enforce a single cultural or national identity, in order to effect acceptance of a new political authority and inclusion in a new body politic, was a flawed axiom of state and nation builders in China and beyond.
Bordering Kham
When Fengquan met his fate in 1905, Kham was a complex patchwork of relatively independent polities beyond the direct authority of Qing and Tibetan officials: a borderland on the cusp of political and economic change. Though situated entirely within the territory of the Qing Empire, Kham became a borderland caught between Tibetan and Sichuanese ambitions, beginning with its nominal division in 1727 by Qing demarcation not of a border, but of a point of interaction-a sandstone stele erected alongside a pass high in the Markhamgang (Ningjing) Mountains, west of the Dri (Jinsha) River, an upper tributary of the Yangtze River (see figure 1) .
The stele designated the lands to its west the "land of burning incense," ruled by the Dalai Lama; those to its south part of Yunnan Province; and those to its east, the largest part of Kham, under Sichuan jurisdiction (Chen G. 1986, 125; Kolmaš 1967, 41) .
3 Sichuan's new western "border,"
marked along the crest of the Markhamgang range on both Qing and foreign maps printed after 1727, ended Lhasa's tenuous claim to temporal authority over polities east of the stele, initiated only several decades earlier with the dispatch of Tibetan commissioners, census takers, and tax collectors as far east as Dartsedo (Shakabpa 1984, 113, 122 China has by wily devices and stern decrees vainly sought to make both her Capital and Emperor objects worthy of Tibetan interest and homage. But Lhasa remains the true mother of all Tibetan-speaking people, and her priests, when the crisis is acute, will recognize her mandates alone; and as agents of the Dalai Lama-the Spiritual Power-will steal the hearts of the people in spite of Chinese mandarins and Tibetan Princes.
As merchant houses, moneylenders, and landlords, Khampa monasteries were important regional economic centers, regulating the distribution of brick tea and extracting labor. But the policy that may have most successfully answered Edgar's call to "exercise" rather than simply assert authority in Kham was the minting of Zangyuan coins. Initiated before Zhao promulgated his forty-three regulations, but dependent on them for its long-term success, the coin perhaps most effectively undermined the monasteries' local power-in the economic realm. Control of the trade and transshipment of border tea in and across Kham was a crucial component of the monasteries' authority, entwined in the commercial and spiritual realms, over Khampa commoners and native rulers, who also held Qing tusi titles. Similarly influenced by perceptions of Tibetans' dependence on tea in their everyday lives, this control perhaps paralleled in form the policy of "using tea to control the Tibetans" (yicha yufan) through tight regulation of the volume of border tea shipped annually to Kham and Tibet initiated by the Ming government and subsequently adopted by the Qing. On a journey in 1870, Cooper (1871, 410) witnessed this control and its reliance on tea, writing, "Grain, yaks, sheep, horses, and even children, are given to the rapacious priesthood in payment for tea." Three decades later, an officer in Zhao's army noted, "Tibetans are addicted to tea as if it were life itself. Each time they drink it, they empty no fewer than ten cupfuls" (Chen Q. [1940] [1941] [1942] British Indian exports at Dromo (Yadong). In 1897, in another sign of its growing influence, the rupee replaced the tael as the trade mart's currency of record for import and export duties (Tao [1907 (Tao [ ] 1985 Chen Y. 1983, 75-76) .
One Chinese researcher (Zhong 1993, 19) estimates that more than 40 million rupees crossed the Himalayas from their first appearance in Tibet until 1911. The effect on military provisions dispatched annually from the Sichuan provincial treasury was devastating. By the early years of the twentieth century, the value of the 103,000 tael disbursements had fallen by roughly one-third, such that for every 10,000 taels in remuneration received, garrisons in Kham, especially along the southern road, could purchase goods valued at the equivalent of only 6,800 taels (Zhang Y. [1907 (Zhang Y. [ ] 1994 (Zhang Y. [ , 1361 . Thus, for the merchants and officials of Sichuan, the presence of Indian rupees on the plateau had become unacceptable, not only weakening the morale-and discipline-of Qing soldiers, but also further destabilizing their already-tenuous authority east of the stele. as Qing imperial influence waned throughout the nineteenth century, the coin fell out of favor (Rhodes 1990 ), replaced by a pretty face.
Emperors and Zangyuan
Imitation of the "vagabond lama"-the appearance of Empress Victoria-distinguished the Qing's second effort to limit a foreign currency's influence on plateau commerce. Commonly known as the Zangyang or Sichuan rupee (Sichuan lubi), the Zangyuan was the first and only imperial coin in general circulation to depict the face of a Chinese emperor (Bailey 1945, 68; Chen Y. 1983, 79 ). Yet in its initial minting, the facial features of the young Guangxu Emperor on the coin's obverse seemed to trace those of Her Majesty (see figure 4) . The flowery detail on the reverse also closely replicated that of the Victorian rupee (see figure 5 ). Over time, his nose, eyes, and even lips would change, but his identical vestments and headpiece-a cap that, like the empress's crown, similarly evoked a "vagabond lama"-remained the same. Trial minting A year before Zhao's appointment as frontier commissioner, Sichuan governor-general Xiliang (QCBDS, no. 0058, 71) equated the task of eradicating Indian rupees with the Qianlong Emperor's assertion of authority over Tibet through minting baozang a century earlier.
"Currency is related to our state's power to govern (zhuquan, sovereignty)," Xiliang proclaimed in 1906, "and Tibet is our vassal." Asserting that Han and Khampa alike happily welcomed the Zangyuan's initial circulation in Luding and environs, he went on to express his belief that the coin "would protect our economic power and authority." Emblazoned with a Victorianized Guangxu, the coin evinced the influence of the first misperception, carrying the weight of expectations that its introduction could repel the rupee invasion and assert absolute and exclusive economic authority. Perhaps reflecting the importance of this goal, in the half decade through 1911, more than 60 percent of all coins minted in the Qing realm were Zangyuan, worth nearly 7.3 million yuan (Chen Y. 1983, 80). 8 Despite the emperor's resemblance to the empress, a pretty face alone was insufficient to propel the Zangyuan to dominance, as the Khampas were comfortable with their "vagabond lamas" and the Han merchants were unwilling to endure sizable losses on exchange. Composed of 93.5 percent silver, the Zangyuan's initial value was set at three qian, five fen, slightly less than the rupee's exchange rate of three qian, seven or eight fen. After its first large-scale minting, however, the Zangyuan fell to only two qian, four or five fen, with merchants rarely receiving more than the equivalent of three qian in goods per coin (QCBDS, no. 0264, 284; Wu 1979, no. 14, 8) . Acknowledging that Guangxu could not compete unless the Han merchants of Kham were provided additional incentive, in 1909 Zhao accommodated merchants' repeated requests, reducing the government exchange rate for Zangyuan to three qian, two fen (QCBDS, no. 0264, 284). Even before this devaluation, however, the commoners of Kham faced mandates to remit tax payments in the weaker currency. In the "Regulations for the Future of Batang," Zhao banned payment in kind for land taxes and directed local officials to accept only Zangyuan or Qing sycee as payment, implicitly forbidding the use of Indian rupees (SA, Qing 7-73 and 7-74).
Two years later, sycee were no longer accepted, and new regulations governing Khampa nomads similarly mandated payment of livestock taxes exclusively in Zangyuan (QCBDS, no. 0390, (436) (437) . Reflecting and strengthening this new currency environment, beginning in 1907 most financial reports used Zangyuan as the sole currency of record, and all salaries and military provisions dispatched from Chengdu were paid in Zangyuan, as were debts and payments to Khampa merchants and commoners.
Suggesting the success of these policies, by spring 1911 Han merchants in Kham reportedly transacted all business in Zangyuan and a new copper tongyuan coin, 10 million of which had been minted two years earlier (Chen Q. 1938 ). In addition, English lieutenant colonel F. M. Bailey found that the Zangyuan held a higher value than the Indian rupee (Bailey 1945, 68) . This tenuous market stability and Zhao's endeavor enticed enough new Han merchants to ascend the plateau that a branch of the Dartsedo Chamber of Commerce opened in the Guandi Temple in Batang ("Batang chuangshe" 1910) on the southern road. And on the northern road, new Han businesses opened in Degé, which their brethren had rarely visited before 1909. One Shaanxi merchant established a teahouse with an accompanying distillery, and another opened a restaurant serving "fine foods" alongside a department store, Cuihua Baihuo Gongsi, which sold both Chinese and foreign goods ("Dege shangye" 1910 ).
Yet the Zangyuan successfully supplanted the Indian rupee only in polities reached by Zhao's frontier army, the coin's influence decreasing where his soldiers were few and his authority thus weak, particularly west of the stele and in Tibet proper, where Indian rupees remained ubiquitous.
9 Even east of the stele, the Zangyuan-and its tongyuan partner-were not the only currencies exchanged in the marketplace, joined by Qing sycee, bankai from Yunnan,
Tibetan tangka, Indian rupees, French francs, Russian rubles, and several paper notes from both neidi and Tibet (Ganzi xianzhi 1990, 195) . Despite this mélange of currencies, however, the growing dominance of the Zangyuan in the Xikang region suggests a measure of success arresting the flow of some economic forces along borders newly delineated by Fu.
Perhaps the most important factor in the Zangyuan's success vis-à-vis the Victorian rupee was that both coins were relatively new to Kham, the "vagabond lama" rupee claiming no special cultural virtue that could not be mimicked by Victorianizing the Guangxu Emperor. Thus, the Zangyuan, once forcibly infused into the economy by Zhao's mandates, encountered little resistance to becoming current, particularly as Indian rupees had already initiated a decline in
Kham's monastery-centered tea brick economy. Late Qing minting of Zangyuan planted the seed of currency exclusivity and absolute economic authority that expanded during the Republican era, when the coin-still adorned with the Guangxu Emperor-became an important regional currency. This coincided with the next governmental delineation of borders, the establishment of Xikang Province.
Zangyuan were minted in Chengdu from 1902 to 1917. By 1916, more than 3 million coins were in circulation, but their value had fallen, fluctuating between two qian, eight fen and two qian, two fen (Zhang C. 2011, 23-25) , and their geographic influence remained limited. will understand the great meaning, whose essence is epitomized by two phrases, loyalty to country and respect for Confucius" (QCBDS, no. 0848, [963] [964] . While the song dissuaded on society, thereby undermining Lhasa's spiritual challenge to Qing authority, the rhyme awakened them to the nationalism at the core of their obligations to China, the sole legitimate source of authority-and identity-in Kham.
Zhao and his successors disregarded the validity of Khampa civilizational mores by presuming they could be swept away by chanting songs in Chinese. Their policies were informed by absolutist conceptions of territorial sovereignty and the perception that legitimate authority The name was later changed to the Xikang Special Administrative Region (Xikang tebie xingzhengqu). 7
Both the qian and the fen are measures of weight, the former equal to one-tenth of a tael, or approximately 3.7 grams, the latter one-tenth of a qian. 8
The Zangyuan circulated in one yuan, half yuan, and quarter yuan denominations. 9
The Sichuan Zangyuan also circulated in the northwestern Kham town of Kyegundo, in today's Qinghai Province, and both Chamdo and Markham (Mangkang), just west of the Markhamgang Mountains. A distinctive Zangyuan adorned with a smiling Guangxu Emperor might have been minted in Xining and circulated in Amdo in 1930 (Zhang 2011 . 10
Soon after its founding, the company's name was changed to the Merchants Frontier Tea Joint Stock Company (Shangban biancha gufen youxian gongsi).
